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Sharing Threat Intelligence is now one of the biggest trends in cyber security industry. 
Today, no one can deny the necessity for information sharing to fight the cyber battle. 
The massive production of raw and redundant data coupled with the increasingly 
innovative attack vectors of the perpetrators demands an ecosystem to scrutinize the 
information, detect and react to take a defensive stance. Having enough sources for 
threat intelligence or having too many security tools are the least of our problems. The 
main challenge lies in threat knowledge management, interoperability between different 
security tools and then converting these filtered data into actionable items across 
multiple devices. Large datasets may help filtering the massive information gathering, 
open standards may somewhat facilitate the interoperability issues, and machine 
learning may partly aid the learning of malicious traits and features of attack, but how do 
we coordinate the actionable responses across devices, networks, and other 
ecosystems to be proactive rather than reactive? This paper presents a study of current 
threat intelligence landscape (Tactic), information sources, basic Indicators of 
Compromise (IOCs) (Technique) and STIX and TAXII standard as open source 
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“Threat is a mirror of security gaps. Cyber-threat is mainly the reflection 
of our weaknesses. An accurate vision of digital and behavioral gaps is 
crucial for a consistent cyber-resilience.”  
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Chapter I: Introduction 
Introduction  
Is every penny spent for securing the business actually helping? A question 
every concerned decision maker would ask to judge the value of their investment. While 
comparing with the increasing capabilities of the perpetrators both in skillset and 
innovativeness, often the Security Operation Center (SOC) team falls behind. They are 
left with analyzing how it happened, learn what was leveraged and try to be proactive 
for the future. This is where Threat Intelligence also known as Cyber Threat Intelligence 
(CTI) comes into play to bridge gaps. CTI can be defined in a lot of ways, but the most 
cited definition is from McMillan (2013) of Gartner, “Threat intelligence is evidence-
based knowledge, including context, mechanisms, indicators, implications and 
actionable advice, about an existing or emerging menace or hazard to assets that can 
be used to inform decisions regarding the subject's response to that menace or hazard.” 
SANS Institute simplified their definition as, “The set of data collected, assessed and 
applied regarding security threats, threat actors, exploits, malware, vulnerabilities and 
compromise indicators.” 
Threat Intelligence (TI) sounds great in theory, but its full advantage can be 
utilized by integrating this knowledge into security operations to augment and automate 
threat detection capability. Threats come from internal and/or external sources, and the 
most painful and time-consuming task is to analyze this abundant incoming 
unstructured raw data to extract meaningful information that is useful enough to take 
informed decisions or action. In an award-winning research, marketing and publishing 
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firm CyberEdge LLC, in their 2017 cyber defense survey report, shows exactly why 
organizations are integrating commercial and/or open source CTI into their existing 
security infrastructure (see Figure 1) (CyberEdge, 2017). The incremental gains of the 
CTI use cases suggest that SOC teams are growing in intelligence-related practices by 




Figure 1: How threat intelligence is being leveraged (CyberEdge, 2017) 
 
Supplemental (i.e., third-party) threat intelligence services continue to be among 
the hottest areas of investment by organizations seeking to bolster their cyberthreat 
defenses. But how are IT security teams actually using this valuable resource – which 
can include everything from ordinary threat indicators (e.g., file hashes and reputation 
data) and threat data feeds (e.g., malware analysis and trend data) to strategic 
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intelligence (e.g., detailed information on adversaries and their motivations, intentions, 
tactics, techniques, and procedures)? (CyberEdge, 2017) 
Traditional methods of blocking bad sites hosting malicious software, and 
applying patches using commercial security products are not enough to defend against 
advanced attacks and gain insight on infiltration TTPs. A threat-based defense strategy 
gains knowledge from analyzing attack incidents and related observables and applies 
that to stop future attacks from happening. MITRE outlines three elements of a 
comprehensive threat-based defense as: 
1. Cyber threat intelligence analysis. 
2. Defensive engagement of the threat. 
3. Focused sharing and collaboration. 
Figure 2 shows the Cyber Attack Lifecycle (first articulated by Lockheed Martin 
as the “kill chain”), a framework developed by CTI analysts to better understand the 
stages of cyberattack. The goal here is to proactively look for indicators of compromise 
(IOC) and defend while the attack is still on the left side of the kill-chain and before the 
perpetrator establishes a foothold. McMillan (2013) of Gartner Inc. identified two key 
challenges of CTI as, 
1. Leading indicators of risk to an organization are difficult to identify when the 




2. Chief Information Security Officers (CISO) have no direct control over threats 




Figure 2: Cyber-attack lifecycle (MITRE, 2017) 
 
It is theorized that all cyber activity can be traced back to the human factor, and 
as a result the motivations, behavior, and intentions that come with it (St.Clair, 2017). 
However, to be aware and be prepared for the attack requires collaboration and sharing 
of IOCs. Several sources and standards have been developed over the years to 
facilitate CTI sharing, but the problem remains at (1) need for a common language and 
(2) derive actionable items at all level. Brief descriptions on different CTI tools and 
standards will be given in the literature review part. 
Problem Statement 
The full effectiveness of CTI falls short of a seamless threat knowledge 
management ecosystem, interoperability between different security tools and then 
converting these filtered data into actionable items across multiple devices. Large 
datasets may help filtering the massive information gathering, open standards may 
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somewhat facilitate the interoperability issues and machine learning may partly aid the 
learning of malicious traits and features of attack, but how do we coordinate the 
actionable responses across devices, networks, and other ecosystems to proactively 
respond to threats rather than being reactive to them? This aspect of the problem is the 
motivation behind this study of Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) sources and standards, 
understand STIX and TAXII as an Expert System and learn how to express IOCs in 
STIX using JSON. This report may also serve as an initial reference to beginners who 
wants to explore the world of CTI. 
Nature and Significance of the Problem 
Several government entities to international consortiums have enacted regulatory 
compliance guidance e.g. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), Statement on Standards 
for Attestation Engagements No. 16 (SSAE16), Payment Card Industry Data Security 
Standard (PCI DSS v3.2) and laws e.g. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA), Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) 
Act, California Security Breach Information Act (SB-1386) to protect data and privacy. 
Corporations that allowed breach of consumer data to happen can expect to be sued by 
the Federal Trade Commission under 15 U.S.C. Sec.45. Nevertheless, lack of proper 
cyber security defenses may result in major security breach disrupting business 
capabilities, loss of proprietary corporate data, loss of customer and business partner 
confidence and costing the organization millions of dollars or more in fines and penalties 
to federal and state regulatory bodies. Safeguarding the highly relied-upon information 
systems and data is critical for organizational success. 
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To be proactive in defending attacks, CTI must be acted upon quickly. The threat 
landscape is constantly changing, and the effectiveness of CTI largely depends on time. 
By exchanging cyber-threat information within a sharing community, organizations can 
leverage the collective knowledge, experience, and capabilities of that sharing 
community to gain a more complete understanding of the threats the organization may 
face. Using this knowledge, an organization can make threat-informed decisions 
regarding defensive capabilities, threat detection techniques, and mitigation strategies. 
By correlating and analyzing cyber-threat information from multiple sources, an 
organization can also enrich existing information and make it more actionable. This 
enrichment may be achieved by independently confirming the observations of other 
community members, and by improving the overall quality of the threat information 
through reduction of ambiguity and errors. Organizations that receive threat information 
and subsequently use this information to remediate a threat confer a degree of 
protection to other organizations by impeding the threat’s ability to spread (Johnson, 
Feldman, Witte and Editors, 2017). 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is also motivating 
organizations to take part in sharing CTI information and build trust relationships 
through its Special Publication (SP) 800-150, Guide to Cyber-Threat Information 
Sharing (Badger, Johnson, Waltermire, Snyder and Skorupka, 2016). 
The study of CTI sources and standards will be helpful for the readers to get up 
to speed with the topic. And learning about STIX and TAXII will give basic 
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understanding on how to identify IOCs, interpret in JSON, share via TAXII and 
contribute observations. 
Objective of the Study 
The objective of this study is to learn different parts of CTI ecosystem and how 
this complex structure can be implemented for proactive cyber defense. 
The goals of this paper are to (1) study the current CTI landscape to have a quick 
understanding of relevant tactics and standards available to the security team and an 
outlook of the CTI sharing architecture; (2) to list major sources of CTI currently used by 
the SOC teams and basic IOCs that are used to trace incidents including how to 
interpret the IOCs to a structured machine-parsable human-readable format like JSON 
in STIX framework; (3) Briefly cover the STIX and TAXII framework to understand how 
they are used to utilize the full value of CTI and also contribute to the CTI ecosystem 
with observables. 
Limitation of the Study 
 Since the threat landscape is constantly evolving, the study only includes past 
and recent publications and tries to analyze and summarize the concepts envisioned in 
these papers. STIX and TAXII are still under development and going through changes 
(some major), so examples shown in this paper should not be used in production under 






Definition of Terms 
Terms Description 
C2 Command and Control stage in Kill-Chain 
CAPEC Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification is a community-driven software 
security effort to create publicly available catalog of attack patterns. 
CCE Common Configuration Enumeration provides unique identifiers to system configuration 
issues in order to facilitate correlation of configuration data across multiple information 
sources and tools. 
CEE Common Event Expression improves the audit process and the ability of users to 
effectively interpret and analyze event log and audit data. 
CIF Collective Intelligence Framework is a cyber threat intelligence management system. 
CISO Chief Information Security Officer is the senior-level executive within an organization 
responsible for establishing and maintaining the enterprise vision, strategy, and program 
to ensure information assets and technologies are adequately protected. 
CPE Common Platform Enumeration is a structured naming scheme for information technology 
systems, software, and packages. 
CPNI Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure is the United Kingdom government 
authority which provides protective security advice to businesses and organizations across 
the national infrastructure. 
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures is a list of common identifiers for publicly known 
cyber security vulnerabilities. 
CVRF Common Vulnerability Reporting Framework is an XML-based language that enables 
cross organization sharing of critical security-related information in a single format. 
CVSS Common Vulnerability Scoring System is a standard way to measure vulnerability severity 
rating 
CWE Common Weakness Enumeration is a community-developed list of common software 
security weaknesses. 
CWSS The Common Weakness Scoring System provides a mechanism for prioritizing software 
weaknesses in a consistent, and open manner. 
DFP Data Feed Provider is a software instance that acts as a producer of STIX 2.0 content. 
FIRST FIRST is the global Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams. 
HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 is a United States legislation 
that provides data privacy and security provisions for safeguarding medical information 
HITECH Subtitle D of Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act 
addresses the privacy and security concerns associated with the electronic transmission 
of health information. 
IDMEF Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format defines data formats and exchange 
procedures for sharing information of interest to intrusion detection and response systems 




IDS, NIDS, HIDS An intrusion detection system is a device or software application that monitors a network 
or systems for malicious activity or policy violations. 
IOC Indicator of Compromise 
IODEF Incident Object Description Exchange Format defines a data representation that provides 
a framework for sharing information commonly exchanged by Computer Security Incident 
Response Teams about computer security incidents. 
IPS, NIPS, HIPS An Intrusion Prevention System is a network security threat prevention technology that 
examines network or system traffic flows to detect and prevent vulnerability exploits. 
JANER-CERT Joint Academic NETwork Computer Emergency Response Team 
JSON JavaScript Object Notation is a lightweight data-interchange format. 
MITRE MITRE is a not-for-profit organization that operates research and development centers 
sponsored by the federal government. 
NIST The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is a measurement standards 
laboratory, and a non-regulatory agency of the United States Department of Commerce 
promoting innovation and industrial competitiveness. 
OASIS Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards is a nonprofit 
consortium that drives the development, convergence and adoption of open standards for 
the global information society. 
OPENIOC A standard for recording, defining and sharing information both internally and externally in 
a machine-readable format 
OSSIM Open Source Security Information and event Management system integrates a selection 
of tools designed to aid network administrators in computer security, intrusion detection 
and prevention. 
OTX Open Threat Exchange is the world's largest crowd-sourced computer-security platform. 
OVAL Open Vulnerability and Assessment Language is an information security community effort 
to standardize how to assess and report upon the machine state of computer systems. 
PCI DSS Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard is an information security standard for 
organizations that handle branded credit cards from the major card schemes. 
REN-ISAC Research & Education Networking Information Sharing & Analysis Centers aids and 
promotes cybersecurity operational protection and response within the research and 
higher education communities. 
RESTFUL API An application program interface (API) that uses HTTP requests to GET, PUT, POST and 
DELETE data. 
RID Real-time Inter-Network Defense outlines a proactive inter-network communication 
method to facilitate sharing incident handling data while integrating existing detection, 
tracing, source identification, and mitigation mechanisms for a complete incident handling 
solution. 
SANS SANS Institute is a private U.S. for-profit company that specializes in information security 




SIEM Security information and event management technology supports threat detection and 
security incident response through the real-time collection and historical analysis of 
security events from a wide variety of event and contextual data sources. 
SOC Security Operations Center is a centralized unit that deals with security issues on an 
organizational and technical level. 
SOX Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 protects investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of 
corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes. 
SSAE16 Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagements 16 is an auditing standard for 
service organizations 
STIX Structured Threat Information Expression is a structured language for cyber threat 
intelligence 
TAXII Trusted Automated Exchange of Intelligence Information is a transport mechanism for 
sharing cyber threat intelligence 
TDS Threat Detection System is a software instance of any network product that monitors 
and/or detects such as Intrusion Detection Software (IDS), Endpoint Detection and 
Response (EDR) software, web proxy, etc. 
TIP Threat Intelligence Platform is a software instance that aggregate correlate and refine 
threat data from multiple sources in real time and share intelligence with other machines 
or security personnel operating in security infrastructure. 
TLP The Traffic Light Protocol is a set of designations used to ensure that sensitive information 
is shared with the appropriate audience. 
TMS Threat Mitigation System is a software instance that acts on course of actions and other 
threat mitigations such as a firewall or IPS, Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) 
software, etc. 
URI / URL Uniform Resource Identifier is a string of characters used to identify a resource. Uniform 
Resource Locator is a reference to a web resource that specifies its location on a 
computer network and a mechanism for retrieving it. 
US-CERT The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team is an organization within the 
Department of Homeland Security’s National Protection and Programs Directorate. 
VERIS Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing is a set of metrics designed to 
provide a common language for describing security incidents in a structured and 
repeatable manner. 
XCCDF Extensible Configuration Checklist Description Format is a structured collection of security 







 For a business to be successful in the current technology era, decision makers 
need to make informed, long term decisions and invest in intelligence-related practices 
more backed by the right skills and technology to proactively defend their assets. 
Leveraging the full potential of supplemental CTI services as a sharing community is the 
smart move now, but it also requires active contribution and feedback from the trust 
groups to improve quality of CTI. A threat-based defense strategy is the core of CTI 
ecosystem and gives the cyber defenders a change to be proactive rather than reactive 
in the kill-chain. Coordination of IOCs, CTI and actionable responses, tracing back 
cyber activities to the human factor and blocking them in response is possible. 
Regulations and laws are guidelines only and may impose compliance restrictions on 
organizations, but the perpetrators roam freely and are very skilled. Fighting this battle 
requires teamwork, vigilance, and quick actions against threats which is only possible 
when CTI is empowered by more active members from the community. This chapter 
gives the readers an insight of the importance of CTI ecosystem and identifies the 
motivation of this paper and study goals. The next chapter will discuss the current CTI 




Chapter II: Background and Review of Literature 
Introduction  
 WannaCry in May 2017, and then NotPetya in June 2017, are just two examples 
of ransomware attacks amongst others spreading into industries across the world 
making the cyber landscape ever more threatening day by day. It is surprising to see 
how organizations are still reluctant to allocate budgets for CTI driven security which is 
crucial to their cyber defense. The 2016 SANS report (Shackleford, 2016) addresses 
this problem and notes, “The [threat intelligence] landscape today is very fragmented, 
and there are few consistent themes in terms of approaches organizations are taking: 
lots of tools, lots of ‘standards’ and little agreement on which are best may lead to more 
confusion. For the future, organizations must be able to use tools and CTI data in a 




Figure 3: CTI ecosystem (Athias, 2015) 
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OASIS (known as SGML Open prior to 1993) Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) 
Technical Committee is a non-profit consortium representing 5,000 participants from 
600 organizations and individual members from 65 countries driving the development, 
convergence, and adoption of open standards for the global information society. OASIS 
is distinguished by its transparent governance and operating procedures. In addition to 
the organizations listed in Figure 3, Boeing, Check Point, Cisco, Dell, HP, Intel Security, 
Microsoft, EMC, Fujitsu, IBM, iboss, iSIGHT Partners, NEC, New Context, BrightPoint 
Security, Tripwire, Palo Alto Networks, Splunk, Resilient, Securonix, Soltra, TELUS, 
ThreatQuotient, ThreatStream, TruSTAR, ViaSat, and many more are collaborating to 
develop the foundational cyber security specifications, STIX, CybOX (now merged with 
STIX 2.0), TAXII with OASIS CTI TC (oasis-open website). A detailed list of supporters 
can also be found at https://wiki.oasis-open.org/cti/Products (Products) and 
https://wiki.oasis-open.org/cti/Open%20Source%20Projects (Open Source Projects). 
How to Approach CTI 
CTI approaches can be looked at from different angles. Farnham (2013) showed 
how CTI can be utilized from a Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) 
perspective taking leverage of its standard processes and deliverables for project 
management in his fictitious project. However, a more classical approach was well 
explained by Poputa-Clean (2015) in his paper regarding automated defense by looking 
at CTI from Strategic Intelligence vs Tactical Intelligence perspective. A third approach 
can be derived from Farnham’s (2013) paper that works with trust groups focusing on 
specific objectives using relevant tools and standards for ease of sharing CTI data. 
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While the project management approach is useful for complex CTI projects, and trust 
groups have CTI data sharing agreement between them, the classical approach is more 
relevant in terms, and understandable to the business decision makers.  
Strategic Intelligence requires more high-level human analysis as it focuses on 
profiling threat actors (such as criminal profiling in CIA, FBI) utilizing CTI of their trend, 
TTPs, targets and tools preferred. Tactical Intelligence is more quantifiable (e.g. IP, 
hash, file name) and machine-parsable but has a very short lifespan as the adversaries 
can change them frequently. Poputa-Clean (2015) includes a list of criteria to classify 
intelligence from Anton Chuvakin’s report on “How to Collect, Refine, Utilize and Create 
Threat Intelligence”. The list identifies CTI Gathering methods, Cost of subscription or 
source, Main usage, Target audience, Specificity or the level of details in the CTI and 
Lifespan or window of the CTI as the classification criteria. As shown in Table 1, 
Poputa-Clean (2015) further differentiates between Strategic and Tactical Intelligence 
from the view point of specificity, type of intelligence, desired outcome, Key 
performance Indicators. 
 
Table 1: CTI use cases (Poputa-Clean, 2015) 
 
Use Case Specificity Strategic/
Tactical 
Product KPI 
Security Planning Low Strategic Security Vision, Response 
Plans, Security Roadmaps 
Success in response to 
targeted attack 
Threat Intelligence 
Collection and Fusion 
Low Both Threat Intelligence Reports 
and Indicators 
 
Incident Response Medium Both Incident Response Time to containment, 
correct identification and 
scoping of incidents 
Enterprise Security 
Monitoring 
High Tactical Blocks, Alerts, Context Time to detection, time to escalation, 




For the executives, value of CTI has increased over time as they can now relate 
qualitative CTI data more with their decision-making capabilities. 2016 SANS Cyber 
Threat Intelligence Survey shows the maturity of CTI programs where 66.4% 
respondents characterized their CTI programs as maturing and above (see Figure 4) 
(Shackleford, 2016). This only proves the increasing demand of CTI and that it is now 
more of a necessity then luxury to the organizations. 
 
 
Figure 4: Maturity of CTI programs (Shackleford, 2016) 
 
CTI Sources 
CTI sources vary depending on if you are a consumer or producer of CTI. 
However, Fernham (2013) categorized the main CTI sources as Internal, Community 
and External.  
1. Internal: CTI collected from sources internal to the organization such as 
monitoring tool (e.g. Antivirus, Firewall, IPS, IDS, HIDS, Honeypot) logs, 




2. Community: CTI shared through trusted relationships such as informal 
groups with member organizations or formal groups. 
3. External: CTI collected through public sources (Open source, books, 
publications, Internet, Crowdsourced platforms) and private sources (Paid 
subscriptions, regular threat feeds from a vendor, purchased services).  
Veerasamy (2017) had a slightly different view of the sources. He quotes the 
three sources of CTI as Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) that consists of CTI data from 
inception and analysis of network data to identify anomalies, Open Source Intelligence 
(OSINT) that contains CTI data that is publicly available through internet, publications or 
crawling technologies to produce good quality CTI and lastly, Human Intelligence 
(HUMINT) that depends on human analysis and research on collected CTI data using 
automated software to detect emerging trend and threat actors. Veerasamy’s (2017) 
framework of CTI lists down the sources as, 
1. Security community and trusted peers 
2. Vendor-driven feeds and subscription services 
3. Own data (logs from network, application, system and data) 
4. Blacklist websites (bad URL's, phishing sites, C&C sites, botnets, malware) 
5. Geographic information about location and source (WHOIS and DNS) 
6. Government/ Governmental agencies 
7. Crowdsource/Open source data 
8. Blogs/online forums 




11. Other intelligence organizations 
Defining the type of CTI sources help understanding where to look for information 
but the selection of sources for qualitative and quantitative CTI almost always should 
follow the below self-directed questions as laid out by Metivier (2016) – 
1. Will this information provide us with actionable intelligence that is relevant to 
our organization’s sector, region, and / or infrastructure? 
2. Will this information provide us with valuable information to build our long-
term knowledge base and strategy? 
If the answers to these questions are not known, then it would be a good idea to 
avoid that source(s). It should be remembered that, actionable CTI is the goal for 
Tactical Intelligence and CTI that provides long term insight is the goal for Strategic 
Intelligence. A lot of standards and tools to share these CTI data does give the 
consumers an option to choose from based on their technology requirements, but it also 
imposes a problem of not having a common standard that can be integrated seamlessly 
across tools, devices and platforms. Next, we will explore some of the major CTI 
sharing standards and tools. 
CTI Sharing Standards 
 The challenges of adopting CTI standards include data privacy, laws governing 
data sharing, fear of reputation due to disclosing attacks. Despite the challenges, 
requirements of structured automated sharing of CTI is growing and several 
organizations including private, public and government have taken major steps to 
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develop standards that works best. Since, a lot of these standards are still under 
development a brief overview of few is given below,     
1. Open Indicators of Compromise (OpenIOC) – introduced in 2011, is an 
extensible XML schema for the description of technical characteristics that 
identify a known threat, an attacker’s methodology, or other evidence of 
compromise. OpenIOC was created by MANDIANT (Farnham, 2013), now a 
FireEye company, still offering their IOC tools e.g. IOC Editor, IOC Finder, 
IOC Writer, Redline for free. It is basically used for tactical CTI. 
2. Incident Object Description Exchange Format (IODEF) – is an XML based 
structured human readable data format developed by Managed Incident 
Lightweight Exchange (MILE), an Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
working group, to describe security incidents for Computer Security Incident 
Response Team (CSIRT). It is backward compatible and heavily based on 
Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF) used for intrusion 
detection systems. IODEF is supported by tools such as Incident Handling 
Shell (ihsh), Incident Handling Library (libih), Script from JANER-CERT (XML-
IODEF), HP ArcSight. Snort supports IMDEF extensions and plugin (SNML). 
IODEF Structured Cybersecurity Information (IODEF-SCI) is an extension of 
IODEF to support additional data classes by embedding existing standards 
within the IODEF document including attack pattern (CAPEC), vulnerability 
(CVE, CVRF, CCE), weakness (CWE) as Method and platform ID (CPE), 
Score (CVSS, CWSS, CCSS), Event Report (CEE), Verification (OVAL, 
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XCCDF), Remediation (RCE) etc. (NICT-CYBEX Forum). Another standard 
developed by MILE based of IODEF model is the Real time Inter-network 
Defense (RID) for communicating CTI which adds Boolean data. 
3. Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing (VERIS) – is a 
framework from Verizon launched in 2010 that is intended for sharing 
strategic intelligence data (actors, actions, assets, attributed) and collective 
view of threat incidents. However, for sharing tactical data it may not be 
considered as useful (The VERIS Framework). Verizon has a publicly 
available community database for VERIS data in JASON format.  
4. Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) – created by the UK Government's National 
Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre (NISCC, now Centre for 
Protection of National Infrastructure - CPNI) in the early 2000 (Wikipedia), is a 
set of labels to categorize the level of sensitive information sharing to proper 
audience. US Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) uses TLP 
according to the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) 
specifications. TLP uses only 4 colors (white, green, amber, red) to label/tag 
information to indicate expected sharing restrictions. White means ‘Public’, 
Green means ‘Restricted to the community’, Amber means ‘Restricted to 
participants’ organizations only’ and Red means ‘Restricted to participants 
only’. The simplicity of TLP allows it to be incorporated in documents, e-mails 
or any system. 
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5. Open Threat Exchange (OTX) - is the world's largest crowd-sourced CTI 
platform with more than 50,000 participants in 140 countries sharing 1m+ 
potential threats daily and It's free to use. Created by AlienVault in 2012, OTX 
is technically a cloud-hosted big data platform that integrates natural 
language processing and machine learning to facilitate the collection and 
correlation of data from many sources, including third-party threat feeds, 
websites, OSSIM, external API and local agents. (Wikipedia)  
6. Collective Intelligence Framework (CIF) – is a CTI management system 
introduced in 2009 and primarily sponsored by the REN-ISAC community and 
NSF. CIF can combine known malicious threat information from many 
sources and use that information for identification (incident response), 
detection (IDS) and mitigation (null route). The most common types of threat 
intelligence warehoused in CIF are IP addresses, domains and URLs that are 
observed to be related to malicious activity (CSIRTGadgets). CIF shares 
threat intelligence through a client/server setup utilizing IODEF as internal 
storage format and provides feeds or allows searches via CLI and RESTFUL 
APIs. CIF is capable of exporting CTI for various security tools (Poputa-
Clean, 2015). 
7. Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) and Trusted 
Automated eXchange of Indicator Information (TAXII) – was created by 
MITRE in 2012 under the patronage of US DHS, currently licensed and 
governed by the nonprofit consortium OASIS CTI TC. STIX and TAXII are 
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community-supported specifications intended for automated CTI sharing for 
real-time network defense, and complex threat analysis. STIX is a fully 
expressive, flexible, structured, machine parsable, human readable language 
for CTI. And TAXII like the name suggests is a CTI data transport system 
(application layer protocol using HTTPS) for STIX with a set of services and 
message exchanges that enable sharing of actionable threat information 
across organizations, products, and services (OASIS CTI TC, 2017). 
CTI Tool 
 As mentioned earlier, there are lots of tools for CTI. Though the range of tools 
varies depending on capability and price, some are still free. Below is a list of some 
popular tools for CTI with their categories, 
1. Open Source software such as YARA is developed by VirusTotal and mostly 
used by malware researchers to identify and classify malware samples. It also 
lets you create descriptions or rules for malware family-based patterns. This 
multi-platform tool can be used through its command-line interface or from 
Python scripts using YARA-Python extension (VirusTotal website).   
2. Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) software such as 
ArcSight, Splunk, QRadar, RSA NetWitness are powerful tools that support 
real time network traffic monitoring allowing incident response of incoming 
traffic easy to the security team. Known threat signatures can be created with 
these tools to get instant alerts and deflect threat. SIEM fusion is a well-
known term for any security operations team. 
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3. CTI Provider Service tool such as Recorded Future can be integrated with 
existing security technologies. It provides real-time machine-readable CTI 
data from numerous threat feeds by adding vital context and IOCs. (Recorded 
Future website). Hail a TAXII.com is a repository of Open Source Cyber 
Threat Intelligence feeds in STIX format (HAIL A TAXII website). 
4. Network Traffic Analysis Frameworks such as SNORT and BRO are also 
open source. Snort was created by Martin Roesch in 1998, now developed by 
Sourcefire which is owned by Cisco since 2013. SNORT can do real-time 
traffic analysis and packet logging on IP networks. It can also perform 
protocol analysis, content searching/matching, and can be used to detect a 
variety of attacks and probes, such as buffer overflows, stealth port scans, 
CGI attacks, SMB probes, OS fingerprinting attempts, and much more 
(SNORT website). BRO is originally written by Vern Paxson, a UNIX based 
network monitoring tool that can be used as NIDS or collecting network 
measurements, conducting forensic investigations, traffic baselining, 
generating extensive set of log files that records network activity in high level 
terms and more. BRO can be considered as tcpdump, Snort, netflow and 
Scripting language (Bro Script) all in one. 
5. Disassembler such as Interactive Disassembler (IDA) Pro can explore binary 
program and map a malicious file’s execution. It can also debug malware 
code to reverse engineer, sometimes bypassing obfuscation, making the 
code more readable. 
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6. Web Proxy tools such as Burp or Burp Suite is a graphical tool for security 
testing of Web applications. The tool is written in Java and is developed by 
PortSwigger Security. In addition to basic functionality, such as proxy server, 
scanner and intruder, the tool also contains more advanced options such as a 
a repeater, a decoder, a comparer, an extender, and a sequencer. 
(Wikipedia) 
7. Cybersecurity Platforms such as ThreatConnect is specifically designed to 
help understanding adversaries, automating workflows, and mitigating threats 
faster using threat intelligence. It can do indicator analytics, threat intelligence 
analysis, orchestration, tasking, and more (ThreatConnect website). 
ENDGAME is another cyber operations platform that supports the detection, 
exploitation, and mitigation of cyber-threats. ThreatQ CTI platform leverages 
integrated self-tuning Threat Library, Adaptive Workbench and Open 
Exchange with robust partner programs to augment security operations. 
Some other prominent platforms are TruSTAR, BrightPoint Security, NORSE, 
Webroot (Cloud & AI), Twistlock (Container Security for Docker, Kubernetes 
and Cloud), LogRhythm (AI & machine Learning), Awesome Threat 
Intelligence. 
“Once an organization has laid the groundwork for a TI implementation by 
defining it, identifying sources and setting expectations, it must take steps to make TI 
actionable”, (Bromiley, 2016, p. 10). These steps may include but not limited to, 
• Incorporating CTI into the organization’s security infrastructure 
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• Using CTI to help drive investigations and response (IOCs and Patterning) 
• Using CTI to look into the past and possibly see things that were missed in the 
absence of the CTI (Host and Network Scanning) 
• Using CTI to look into the future (Automate for proactive response) 
Indicators of Compromise 
Using CTI to help drive investigations and response can be achieved by utilizing 
information on Indicators of compromise (IOC) and Patterning for contextual information 
on the course of attack. IOCs are the atomic pieces of artifacts or observable data that 
can be utilized to detect data breaches quickly. Examples of IOCs are IP addresses of 
Command and Control (C2) servers, domain names, URLs, registry settings, email 
addresses, HTTP user agent, file mutex, file hashes, compile times, file size, name, path 
locations, hash values or similar metadata that may occur during an attack. These IOCs 
greatly help organizations or network defenders to identify unusual activity on the network 
or odd clues on systems that may indicate attacker activity and take preventive measures. 
“By preventing compromise in the first place, the resultant risk is reduced in a way 
unachievable through the conventional incident response process” (Hutchins, Cloppert 
and Amin, 2010, p.12).  
In the same white paper (Hutchins et al., 2010), the authors also presented tables 
to show which tools may be utilized to detect, deny, disrupt, degrade, deceive, and 
destroy the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) IOCs in the Lockheed Martin’s Kill-Chain 
phases. See Table 2 which was created by combining table 1 and table 2 from Hutchins 
et al. (2010 p. 5, 10). However, more than one indicator can be combined to create a 
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single IOC and not all indicators are equal as some could be more valuable than the 
others. This is illustrated in Figure 5 (Dittrich and Carpenter, 2016) which was originally 
created by Mandiant (now, a FireEye company). Table 2 and Figure 5 are of course not 
showing the same IOC examples. 
 
 












Table 2: Kill-chain, courses of action matrix and indicators (Hutchins et al., 2010) 
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The basic IOCs as detailed by Bianco (2014) in what he called his “Pyramid of 
Pain” (see Figure 6) are Hash Values, IP addresses, Domain names, Network/Host 
Artifacts, tools and TTPs (tactic, technique, procedure). This pyramid also shows the level 
of pain given to the adversary, should they pivot and continue with the planned attack, 




Figure 6: Pyramid of pain with IOCs (Bianco, 2014) 
 
At the base of the pyramid is Hash Values (e.g. SHA1, MD5 or other similar 
hashes) often used to uniquely identify specific malware samples or malicious files 
found/involved in an attack. Even though hashes can be considered as the most accurate 
type of indicator, the adversary can easily change the hash value by altering an 
insignificant bit in the file and move forward. Moving to Fuzzy hashes can be a solution 
to this problem. 
IP Addresses (e.g. IPv4 98.139.180.149 or IPv6 2002:4559:1FE2::4559:1FE2) 
are the most fundamental connection indicator. IP address denial is easy and quick to 
evade for an adversary using proxy service.  
Domain Names (e.g. "evil.net" or "this.is.sooooo.evil.net") are mapping between 
an IP address and a URL. DNS request predicts the domain name connection requests 
made by any host. Domain name IOCs are useful to either monitor them for active 
connections or add to a blocklist for the future (Mack, 2015). The time to live (TTL) of an 
IP address in terms of IOC usage in a security deployment could be very low compared 
to the domain name. Changing domain names to evade detection involves registering 
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new name, paying for it maybe with fraudulent fund and hosting somewhere to make it 
visible to the internet which causes time delay for the adversary. Harder than evading IP 
addresses but is still doable.  
Network Artifacts (URI patterns, C2 information embedded in network protocols, 
distinctive HTTP User-Agent or SMTP Mailer values) and Host Artifacts (registry keys 
or values, files, directories, locations, names, services or anything that is distinctive) when 
detected and denied can have negative impact on the adversary causing them to expend 
effort in identifying giveaway artifacts, fixing, reconfiguring and recompiling their tools. 
The fix could be easy for the adversary but the long time to recover is annoying for them. 
Tools (software, scripts) for IOC include utilities designed by the adversaries to 
maybe create malicious documents for spear-phishing, scripts opening backdoors utilized 
to establish C2 communication, or password crackers and maybe some other host-based 
utilities they want to use after a successful intrusion. AV or YARA signatures, network 
aware tools with a distinctive communication protocol, and fuzzy hashes can be used as 
IOC Tool indicators. Once the artifacts of the adversaries’ tool(s) are detected, it is as if 
taking their weapons away from them. Now the adversaries must find or create a new tool 
- minus the detected artifacts - for the same purpose, get armed and train if needed, which 
will cost them considerable time. 
When we detect and respond to TTPs (kill-chain phase actions that an adversary 
takes to accomplishing their mission), we are operating at the level of adversaries’ 
behavior and tendencies. Denying adversaries at this level, will force them to either learn 
new behaviors or reinvent themselves or just give up. TTPs are the ideal and most 
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valuable IOCs in terms of cyber defense. Spear-phishing with a trojaned PDF file or with 
a link to a malicious .SCR file disguised as a ZIP, dumping cached authentication 
credentials, and reusing them in Pass-the-Hash attacks are examples of TTPs. 
There are many ways of representing indicators. YARA signatures are usually 
used for detecting malicious executables, and Snort/Bro can be used for detecting known 
signatures in network communications. Success of an attack investigation also depends 
on how confidently IOC evidences can be linked together with other events to understand 
adversaries’ pattern of behavior. YARA can create free form signatures to tie indicators 
to actors and allow security analysts to look deeper than just hashes, IP addresses, and 
domains. This brings context to the investigation. Attack footprints are good, but we also 
must keep in mind that the footprints may change between attacks. IOCs offer hope, 
Patterns provide confidence. 
 
 
Figure 7: IOCs vs Patterning (Johnson, 2016) 
 
Johnson (2016) explained the difference between Indicators and Patterns (Figure 
7) with a simple burglary example that outlines the pattern as “When someone drives 
near the store late at night THEN attempts to enter the building THEN attempts to 
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deactivate the alarm THEN opens the register drawer, we almost CERTAINLY have an 
attempted burglary on our hands.” and indicators as people with “blue shirt and short”, 
“light hair color”, “hiking backpack”, “crowbar” etc.  
A more relevant example of patterning was also given by Johnson (2016) as, 
“Outlook spawns Acrobat as a child to handle an attachment. That Acrobat then spawns 
an unsigned binary in a temporary user directory, which in turn spawns svchost.exe. 
That svchost is running as a non-typical user for that process.” 
Rudman and Irwin (2017) presented a detailed framework in their paper which 
shows automatic generation of IOCs from malware analysis. Their flowchart (see Figure 
8) utilizes Cuckoo sandbox (an automated malware analysis system) to analyze 
malware sample that generates a PCAP file to record the network traffic information. 
Then this PCAP file gets trimmed using a custom processing module (tshark). From the 
filtered PCAP file, required properties were extracted using another custom reporting 
module to use for object data modeling. Lastly, python-cybox and python-stix libraries 
were utilized to generate actionable IOCs which was packaged before transportation to 
other CTI tools for scanning, monitoring and dissemination. 
 
 




PCAP file Processing Module (filter PCAP)
Reporting Module (Create IOCs)
Indicators of Compromise Generate IDS/Firewall rules
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IOCs represent threat intelligence in the cyber world. “Threat Intelligence 
framework is capable to provide enhanced evidence collection, actionable intelligence 
and central investigation for organization wide security solutions and open source 
intelligence feeds.” (Gheorghică and Croitoru, 2016). A new framework for enhanced 
measurable cybersecurity in computer networks was introduced in their paper (see 
Figure 9 below). Their modular design shows capabilities to provide enhanced evidence 
collection (data load and normalization), create actionable intelligence (advanced 
analytics) and central investigation portal (reporting and threat intelligence 
dissemination) for organization wide security solutions. 
 
 




One of the major challenges organizations face while defending their network is 
being able to see enough of the network to identify recent most advanced, multi-vector 
threats. Ideally, organizations need to be able to see across the distributed network, 
including cloud deployments and devices from multiple network and security vendors. 
You then need to correlate detected local activity with global threat intelligence and 
expected behaviors and coordinate a response across the entire portfolio of installed 
security solutions.  
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Chapter III: Methodology 
Introduction  
 The aim of this study is to provide a comprehensive overview that will help to 
understand the current CTI ecosystem and explore into STIX and TAXII frameworks as 
common standards. To be able to do that, information and references were collected in 
a methodical, trackable, and repeatable manner for them to be acceptable. 
Design of the Study 
 The framework of the study was divided into three parts,  
1. Tactics: Includes qualitative research on what is CTI, it’s value to the 
organizations and why they are using CTI, how CTI can be leveraged to be 
proactively defend networks on the left side of the kill-chain, and government 
initiatives to encourage CTI sharing etc. 
2. Techniques: Includes research on who are contributing to CTI development, 
how CTI can be used strategically as well as tactically to augment security 
efforts in organizations, where to source CTI from, standards facilitating 
structured sharing of CTI data amongst participating members, existing tools 
that generate, manage, and support different types of CTI data, and 
identifying the basic artifacts that may indicate an attack or compromise in a 
network.   
3. Procedures: Includes research focusing on STIX 2.0 and TAXII 2.0 as the 
common standard under development for CTI sharing, exploring into the STIX 
42 
 
Core Concepts and Objects, STIX Observables Core Concepts and Objects, 
STIX Patterning, and also study the TAXII RESTful API framework. 
Information Collection 
 Information for this study was collected using multistage sampling.  
In the first stage, cluster sampling was used to group information requirements 
for each part of the study design. So, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures were each 
considered as a group based on information requirement.  
In the second stage, purposive sampling was used to subjectively look for 
information relevant to each cluster or groups of information from the first stage. For 
example, to define CTI, a search with the string “What is CTI” can be used to source 
reference materials online. 
 At the last stage, random links from the search results of second stage were 
selected to look for acceptable publications or articles specific to the query (e.g. defining 
CTI) or purpose. 
Information Analysis  
 To have a balanced understanding of the topic, a broad spectrum of information 
sources was considered. For this study, reference materials were analyzed from 
sources such as, 
• GIAC (GCIH) Gold Certified research papers from SANS 
• Peer-reviewed articles and journals  
• Conference papers and presentations 
• Government publications (gadgets, bulletins) 
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• Publications from Research organizations 
• CTI survey reports 
• Publications from service providers 
• Framework specification documents 
• Discussion forums 
• News articles 
• Blogs & Posts 
• Websites 
• Social Network posts 
Summary 
This chapter detailed the design of the study, multistage sampling in information 
collection and different sources for information analysis in the study. The methodical 
way of collecting information would be useful for anyone thinking about doing similar 
research work.  
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Chapter IV: Data Presentation and Analysis 
Introduction 
 Collection of actionable Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) has been one of the top 
interests within the information security realm over the past few years. Given the 
increasing sophistications of adversaries, it has now become a necessity for the 
organizations to utilize the full potential of CTI through automation and readily process 
IOCs to analyze, detect and defend their network assets. Though the number of 
organizations taking part in development and implementation of CTI-enabled expert 
systems in their Security Operation Center (SOC) are increasing by the day, many still 
do not know how to take full advantage of CTI and fewer still are actually doing so. A 
SANS survey on “Who's Using Cyberthreat Intelligence and How?” by Shackleford 
(2015, p19), reveals that only 38% of respondents are using CTI data either utilizing a 
standard format or a well-known open source toolkit where, 
• Open Threat Exchange (OTX) - 51% 
• Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) - 46% 
• Collective Intelligence Framework (CIF) - 39% 
• Open Indicators of Compromise (OpenIOC) framework - 33% 
• Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information (TAXII) - 33% 
• Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) - 28% 
• Cyber Observable eXpression (CybOX) - 26% 
• Incident Object Description and Exchange Format (IODEF) - 23% 
• Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing (VERIS) - 20% 
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It is clear from above that even if OTX is a very popular tool, majority of the 
respondents are using the STIX and TAXII standards (CybOX now merged in STIX 2.0) 
most commonly in enterprise organizations as seen by Shackleford (2015). Even 
though STIX and TAXII standards are still under development, STIX became the most 
popular standard in 2017 with 40% closely followed by OpenIOC at 38% (Shackleford, 
2017). However, in his recent survey report, Shackleford (2018) revealed that, “Most 
security teams are integrating CTI feeds into the environment using dedicated threat 
intelligence platforms (57%), followed by APIs (vendor-provided at 48%, followed 
closely by custom APIs at 46%)”. This is very promising for STIX and TAXII as a 
package. 
 Sharing of CTI through a common standard is the only way organizations can get 
ahead in this cyber battle against adversaries. In this chapter we will focus on the STIX 
2.0 and TAXII 2.0 as the common standards to understand how CTI data are presented 
in JASON while converting sample IOCs to STIX format as examples and analyze the 
data flow of the TAXII 2.0 server and client. 
Data Presentation in STIX 2.0 Standard 
 A brief introduction for OASIS CTI Technical Committee (TC), STIX and TAXII 
was covered in chapter-II of this paper. In short, Structured Threat Information 
eXpression (STIX) is an open source and free language and serialization format to 
efficiently characterize and communicate cyber threat intelligence. Trusted Automated 
Exchange of Indicator Information (TAXII) is the HTTPS/TLS protocol to transport and 
share STIX bundle. 
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STIX 1.x vs STIX 2.x. Powered by a collective community driven development, 
early users of STIX quickly noted the limitations of the STIX 1.x design choices in terms 
of the usefulness of the standard. STIX 2.0 was approved in March 2017 by OASIS CTI 
TC (2017) and built on the working foundation of STIX 1.2 reflecting with the community 
feedbacks. Figure 10 shows the objects defined in STIX 1.2 and STIX 2.0 architectures, 
 
 
Figure 10: Comparison of STIX 1.2 and STIX 2.0 objects (MacDonald, 2017) 
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STIX 2.0 focused on developing a set of flexible building blocks for the content 
creators to easily model actual practice of threat intelligence. Key improvements in STIX 
2.0 over STIX 1.2 includes (Wunder, 2017),  
• STIX 1.x used XML as an exchange format, STIX 2.0 uses JSON. This 
matches common practice in development today and should drive adoption. 
• STIX 1.x focused on flexibility, STIX 2.0 stresses simplicity and 
standardization. There are now fewer options and more requirements making 
STIX 2.0 easier to implement, a requirement for broad industry adoption. 
• STIX 1.x contained connections, but by making it explicit, STIX 2.0 allows 
analysts and defenders to easily draw connections between seemingly 
unrelated data, follow chains from IOCs to the adversaries behind the 
compromise, and build out connections over time. 
• CybOX (Cyber Observable Expression) has been merged into the STIX 2.0 
specification. Now, STIX 2.0 is a multi-part specification with parts for STIX 
Core, STIX Objects, Cyber Observable Core, Cyber Observable Objects, and 
STIX Patterning. 
STIX objects. STIX 2.0 is a graph-based model, where STIX Domain Objects 
(SDO), representing concepts in the cyber domain and used to describe things, are 
related to each other using STIX Relationship Objects (SRO). Complex representations 
of CTI can be expressed by connecting multiple SDOs through SROs. STIX 2.0 also 
uses ID references to represent embedded relationships (STIX-v2.0-Pt1-Core). A 
detailed introduction and visual representations for each STIX 2.0 SDOs and SROs can 
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be found at https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-documentation/stix/intro (For quick reference, 
see appendix A). However, for a quick understanding of the STIX 2.0 standard, let us 
cover some brief information collected from OASIS Committee Specification documents 
found at https://www.oasis-open.org/news/announcements/stix-v2-0-and-taxii-v2-0-are-
now-oasis-committee-specifications. 
As shown in Figure 10 above, STIX 2.0 specification (STIX-v2.0-Pt2-Objects) 
defines twelve SDOs (Attack Pattern, Campaign, Course of Action, Identity, Indicator, 
Intrusion Set, Malware, Observed Data (Observable), Report, Threat Actor, Tool, and 
Vulnerability) and two SROs (Relationship, Sighting). Figure 11 below shows an 
example of how STIX 2.0 SDO relationships are represented in graph and we note that 
the SDOs represent the ‘nodes’ while SROs represent the ‘edges’ of the graph.  
 
 
Figure 11: STIX 2.0 SDO relationship example (OASIS CTI TC, 2017) 
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 Each STIX 2.0 SDOs and SROs have their own set of ‘properties’ that represent 
information specific to that object and ‘relationships’ that describes the way that object 
can be related to any other object. Some properties are common for all objects, some 
properties are required while others are optional for a particular object. JSON 
(JavaScript Object Notation), which is a data-interchange format, is used to express 
STIX 2.0 information as serialized objects. More on JSON can be found at 
http://www.json.org/. An example of STIX 2.0 Indicator Object representation in JSON is 
given below where type, id, created_by_ref, created, modified and labels are common 
properties and type, labels, pattern and valid_from are required properties for the 
Indicator Object. 
{ 
    "type": "indicator", 
    "id": "indicator--8e2e2d2b-44d4-4cbf-938f-34ee46b3cd3f", 
    "created_by_ref": "identity--f431f809-377b-45e0-aa1c-6a4751cae5ff", 
    "created": "2018-03-03T20:03:48.000Z", 
    "modified": "2018-03-03T20:03:48.000Z", 
    "labels": ["malicious-activity"], 
    "name": "Poison Ivy Malware", 
    "description": "This file is part of Poison Ivy", 
    "pattern": "[ file:hashes.'SHA-256' = 
'4bac27393bdd9333ce02453256c5533cd02275510b2227f473d03f533924f877' ]", 
    "valid_from": "2018-01-01T00:00:00Z" 
  } 
According to the STIX 2.0 specification, the id property universally and uniquely 
identifies an SDO, SRO, Bundle, or Marking Definition. It must follow the format ‘object-
type--UUIDv4’, where object-type is the exact value from the type property of the object 
being identified or referenced and UUIDv4 is RFC 4122-compliant. Timestamps are in 
UTC time zone (indicated by “Z”) and follow the format YYYY-MM-DDTHH:mm:ss.000Z. 
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Also, all type names (separated by ‘-‘), property names (separated by ‘_’), and literals 
(separated by ‘-’) should be in lowercase and between 3-250 characters. 
Apart from the STIX 2.0 Relationship object, the only other type of SRO currently 
defined in STIX 2.0 is the Sighting Object which allows CTI sharing communities to 
provide feedback when a STIX 2.0 object is seen in their network. It requires 
sighting_of_ref property to reference the sighted object. 
Marking definition contains the actual data markings applied to STIX objects by 
using the object_marking_refs and granular_markings properties. While being open to 
all sorts of data markings, STIX 2.0 specification (STIX-v2.0-Pt1-Core) defines ‘TLP’ to 
capture the Traffic Light Protocol markings and ‘Statement’ to capture text marking i.e. 
terms of use. Marking definitions cannot be versioned like other STIX 2.0 Objects to 
prohibit indirect changes to the same markings used in different STIX 2.0 objects.  
A Bundle is a container object that is used to group together a collection of STIX 
2.0 Objects for transportation and sharing. A Bundle does not have any semantic 
meaning and Objects in the same bundle may or may not be related to each other. A 
Bundle does not have any common properties except the required type, id and 
spec_version (indicating STIX specification) properties as it is not a STIX 2.0 object. 
The list of collected STIX 2.0 Objects are then contained in the objects property list. 
Bundle is transient, and STIX 2.0 implementations should not assume it as a persistent 
object. An example follows (STIX-v2.0-Pt1-Core), 
 { 
     "type": "bundle", 
     "id": "bundle--8e2e2d2b-44d4-4cbf-938f-34ee46b3cd3f ", 
     "spec_version": "2.0", 
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     "objects": [ 
         { 
             "type": "indicator", 
             … 
         }, 
         { 
             "type": "malware", 
             … 
         }, 
         { 
             "type": "relationship", 
             … 
         } ] } 
 ‘STIX 2.0 Producer’ is the entity that creates an Object and ‘STIX 2.0 Consumer’ 
is the entity that receives an object created using STIX 2.0 SDOs and SROs. 
Cyber observables objects. The common data types used throughout STIX 2.0 
are Boolean, external-reference, float, hashes, identifier, integer, kill-chain-phase, list, 
open-vocab, string and timestamp. STIX 2.0 also uses binary, hex, dictionary, object-ref 
and observable-objects as additional data types specifically for Cyber Observable 
Object types (STIX-v2.0-Pt3-Cyb-Core). These observable objects are required in STIX 
2.0 to describe structured representation of SDO and SRO properties in the cyber 
domain with greater details. These objects can describe one or more observed data 
points or IOCs to characterize host-based, network, and related entities.  
STIX 2.0 specification (STIX-v2.0-Pt4-Cyb-Objects) defines eighteen Observable 
object data models - Artifact Object, AS Object, Directory Object, Domain Name Object, 
Email Address Object, Email Message Object, File Object, IPv4 Address Object, IPv6 
Address Object, MAC Address Object, Mutex Object, Network Traffic Object, Process 
Object, Software Object, URL Object, User Account Object, Windows™ Registry Key 
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Object, and X.509 Certificate Object. Relationships in Cyber Observable Objects are 
references represented as properties of an Observable Object containing the keys of 
the target Cyber Observable Object(s) within the scope of the dictionary. However, to 
encode additional data beyond the defined Object data models, STIX 2.0 permits 
additional properties through Predefined Cyber Observable Object Extensions. 
Following example shows an ICMP Network Traffic with Source / Destination IPv4 
Addresses, extensions properties and AS (autonomous-system) using Object Models. 
The belongs_to_refs property in the first IPv4 Address Object specifies that the only 
valid target of the relationship is one or more AS Object(s). 
{ 
  "0": { 
    "type": "ipv4-addr", 
    "value": "198.35.100.2", 
    "belongs_to_refs": ["3"] 
  }, 
  "1": { 
    "type": "ipv4-addr", 
    "value": "198.35.100.3" 
  }, 
  "2": { 
    "type": "network-traffic", 
    "src_ref": "0", 
    "dst_ref": "1", 
    "protocols": [ 
      "icmp" 
    ], 
    "extensions": { 
      "icmp-ext": { 
        "icmp_type_hex": "08", 
        "icmp_code_hex": "00" 
      } 
    } }; 
  "3": { 
    "type": "as" 
    "number": 42, … 
  } } 
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 STIX patterning. According to STIX 2.0 specification (STIX-v2.0-Pt5-Patterning), 
“STIX Patterning language allows matching against timestamped Cyber Observable 
data collected by a threat intelligence platform or similar system so that other analytical 
tools and systems can be configured to react and handle incidents that might arise.” 
Unlike others, STIX Patterning is a cross domain, SQL like language for describing 
chaotic maliciousness one might see. A rule for what to search for using temporal 
operators and modifiers. A simple example of STIX Patterning is shown in Figure 12 
where an Observation Operator is used to specify that an observation of a domain 
name ‘z’ must follow the observation of the IP addresses ‘x’ or ‘y’, along with a different 
Qualifier to state an observation window ‘600 Seconds’. 
 
 




Following two examples illustrates STIX Indicator Patterns equivalent to YARA 
and SNORT rules (Darley and Keirstead, 2017),  
STIX Indicator Pattern for Basic File with Hexadecimal Payload 
[file:contents_ref.payload_bin  
MATCHES '\\x43\\x78\\x77\\x6c\\x70\\x6a\\x68'  
AND file:size > '32152'] 
Corresponding YARA Rule, 
rule Example 
{ 
strings: $hex_string = { 43 78 77 6c 70 6a 68 } 
condition: $hex_string and filesize > 32152 
}  
Again, STIX Indicator Pattern for basic TCP Network Traffic, 
[network-traffic:src_ref.type = 'ipv4-addr'  
AND network-traffic:src_ref.value = '192.35.100.5'  
AND network-traffic:dst_ref.type = 'ipv4-addr'  
AND network-traffic:dst_ref.value = '203.66.200.6'  
AND network-traffic:dst_port = '21'  
AND network-traffic:protocols[*] = 'tcp']  
Corresponding SNORT Rule, 
  alert tcp 192.35.100.5 any -> 203.66.200.6 21 
 Now that we understand how CTI data is represented in STIX 2.0 Standard, we 
can try to convert some IOCs to STIX format before exploring into TAXII 2.0 Standard. 
Converting IOCs to STIX 2.0 Standard 
 IOCs, explained earlier in Chapter II as Pyramid of Pain (Bianco, 2014), are 
expressed using Cyber Observable Objects in STIX 2.0 standard and are used by 
various STIX Domain Objects (SDO), specially the Observed Data SDO. Including 
multiple Cyber Observable Objects in a single SDO instance is possible when they are 
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related. However, it is best practice to use separate SDOs for unrelated data. Earlier 
example (ICMP network traffic) in this chapter shows representation of IP Address and 
Network Artifact. We are going to see some more IOC representations in STIX 2.0 
standard in this section.  
Following example shows a STIX 2.0 bundle with three unrelated observed data 
SDOs and a Tool SDO. For each observed-data object, first_observed, last_observed 
and number_observed properties are required apart from the common properties. Also, 
the cyber observable objects (IOCs) needs to be included in the SDO’s property. As we 
can see here, the first Observed-data SDO contains the file hashes, name, and size to 
represent the file and it was seen only once by the STIX producer as in created_by_ref 
property. The second Observed-data SDO is created by the same producer and 
contains a Windows Registry key value that may have been created by a malware and 
was observed once. The third Observed-data SDO contains a basic HTTP network 
traffic for an interesting domain name ‘g00gle.com’ that resolves to an IPv4 address of 
‘198.11.100.44’. This was observed 47 times by the same producer. The fourth object in 
the bundle created by the producer is a Tool SDO that contains a remote access 
software ‘VNC’ which may have been used by threat actor(s) to perform attacks. Some 
common object properties are truncated for brevity. 
{ 
 "type": "bundle", 
 "id": "bundle--a836f05a-f235-4b4b-b523-bd87e40478a1", 
 "spec_version": "2.0", 
 "objects": [ 
  { 
   "type": "observed-data", 
   "id": "observed-data--cf8eaa41-6f4c-482e-89b9-9cd2d6a83cb1", 
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   "created_by_ref": "identity--987eeee1-413a-44ac-96cc-0a8acdcc2f2c", 
   "created": "2017-02-28T19:37:11.213Z", 
   "modified": "2017-02-28T19:37:11.213Z", 
   "first_observed": "2017-02-27T21:37:11.213Z", 
   "last_observed": "2017-02-27T21:37:11.213Z", 
   "number_observed": 1, 
   "objects": { 
    "0": { 
     "type": "file", 
     "hashes": { 
             "MD5": "1717b7fff97d37a1e1a0029d83492de1", 
             "SHA-1": "c79a326f8411e9488bdc3779753e1e3489aaedea" 
     }, 
     "name": "creamcheese.pdf", 
     "size": 55896 
    } 
   } }, 
  { 
   "type": "observed-data", 
   "id": "observed-data--a0d34360-66ad-4977-b255-d9e1080421c4", 
   "created_by_ref": "identity--987eeee1-413a-44ac-96cc-0a8acdcc2f2c", 
   …… 
   "number_observed": 1, 
   "objects": { 
    "0": { 
     "type": "windows-registry-key", 
     "key": "HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Services\\WSALG2" 
    } 
   } }, 
  { 
   "type": "observed-data", 
   "id": "observed-data--9518e286-2b38-11e8-b467-0ed5f89f718b", 
       "created_by_ref": "identity--987eeee1-413a-44ac-96cc-0a8acdcc2f2c", 
   …… 
   "number_observed": 47, 
   "objects": { 
    "0": { 
     "type": "domain-name", 
     "value": "g00gle.com", 
     "resolves_to_refs": [ 
      "2" 
     ] 
    }, 
    "1": { 
     "type": "network-traffic", 
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     "dst_ref": "0", 
     "protocols": [ 
      "ipv4", 
      "tcp", 
      "http" 
     ] 
    }, 
    "2": { 
     "type": "ipv4-addr", 
     "value": "198.11.100.44" 
    } 
   }  }, 
  { 
   "type": "tool", 
   "id": "tool--8e2e2d2b-17d4-4cbf-938f-98ee46b3cd3f", 
   "created_by_ref": "identity--987eeee1-413a-44ac-96cc-0a8acdcc2f2c", 
   …… 
   "labels": [ "remote-access"], 
   "name": "VNC" 
  } ] } 
 IOCs are very time sensitive and useful when shared and acted upon quickly. 
This is where automation is crucial and TAXII can help transport STIX content freely 
and securely across networks. 
Data Communication through TAXII 2.0 Standard 
 TAXII as mentioned in Chapter II of this document, is an application layer 
protocol used for CTI data transportation over HTTPS/TLS. It works as a protected 
repository for IOC collection and sharing as well as compare information. It also allows 
to record and share suspicious traffic log activities translated into universal format. 
Though TAXII 2.0 supports other data standards, it is specifically optimized to exchange 
CTI represented in STIX and support for STIX 2.0 content is mandatory to implement. 
The complete TAXII Committee Specification document referenced for this section can 
be found at http://docs.oasis-open.org/cti/taxii/v2.0/cs01/taxii-v2.0-
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cs01.html#_q0a03pfr5x7n. The following section covers higher-level understanding of 
data flow in TAXII 2.0 standard.  
Figure 13 shows the different components and services in a TAXII 2.0 structure. 
TAXII defines a RESTful API (or web service) with two primary services, Collections and 
Channels, to support various sharing models (i.e.peer-to-peer, source-subscriber, hub-
and-spoke). TAXII Servers uses DNS service record to advertise its network location 
internally or externally and must use the service name ‘taxii’. Discovery methods 
(Network and Endpoint) are used to get the location, supported services and capabilities 
of the TAXII Server and its API Root(s). 
 
 
Figure 13: API root components (TAXII-v2.0) 
 
An instance of TAXII server API supports multiple API Roots to facilitate logical 
grouping of services needed by a CTI sharing community, trust groups, organizations 
etc. In this case, each API Root will be considered as the ‘root’ URL for that group and 
will have their own defined endpoints for information collection using Discovery. 
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Collections provided by the TAXII Server API Root(s) is a repository for CTI objects 
(sorted using added date in ascending) that exchanges information with a TAXII Client 
in request-response manner. Channels on the other hand is a way for authorized TAXII 
Clients to communicate messages with other authorized TAXII Clients in the same 
TAXI Server channel using publish-subscribe model. See Appendix B and C for better 
visuals on TAXII 2.0 deployments and channel communication. Each API Root can host 
multiple Collections and Channels. In TAXII 2.0, Status request allows a TAXII Client to 
check on CTI object submission requests for Collections with the TAXII Server. Figure 
14 shows the concepts of Collections and Channels with their data flows,  
 
 
Figure 14: Channels and Collections communicaton (TAXII-v2.0) 
 
TAXII 2.0 standard (TAXII-v2.0) uses the following to define data types - api-root, 
Boolean, bundle, collection, collections, dictionary, discovery, error, identifier, integer, 
list, manifest, object, status, string and timestamp.  
TAXII 2.0 uses HTTP for authentication and content negotiation only. TAXII 
Clients must include an acceptable authorized header, granting their access to an 
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object, while requesting through Endpoints that require authentication or the TAXII 
Server rejects the request with a HTTP 401 code ‘Unauthorized’ and WWW-
Authenticate header. 
Summary  
 Data integration has always been a challenge for data providers or data 
integrators due to the differences in proprietary data formats. Limitations also exist in 
capabilities of devices and software used in network security and monitoring. STIX 2.0 
offers a common language for data presentation utilizing JSON that all vendors can 
easily follow through and eventually get rid of the interoperability issues between 
sharing systems. In this chapter we have studied all five STIX 2.0 specification 
documents published thus far to understand and summarize how data is represented 
through SDOs, SROs, Versioning, Data Marking, Patterning and Cyber Observable 
Objects. We explored the improvements of STIX 2.0 over STIX 1.2 and looked at some 
examples of how IOCs are expressed in SDOs using Cyber Observable Objects. We 
have also studied TAXII specification document to understand the components in a 
TAXII 2.0 API and data flow in a TAXII 2.0 Server-Client model through Collections and 
Channels. Now, it is time to plug in all the information we have studied so far in this 
paper and draw some conclusions in the next chapter.  
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Chapter V: Results, Conclusion, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
 The objective of this paper was to learn about the different parts of Cyber Threat 
Intelligence (CTI) ecosystem and how this complex structure can be expressed through 
STIX 2.0 and TAXII 2.0 standards for proactive cyber defense. In this chapter, we will 
summarize what we have learned thus far and draw some concluding remarks. We will 
also look at some future work that can be done with support of the knowledge learned 
from this paper. 
Results 
This study of the current CTI landscape reveals that, “Threat intelligence is 
currently very loosely defined, with little agreed consensus on what it is and how to use 
it. There is a risk that in the hurry to keep up with the threat intelligence trend, 
organizations will end up paying large amounts of money for products that are 
interesting but of little value in terms of improving the security of their business. ‘Doing’ 
threat intelligence is important – but doing it right is critical.” (Chismon and Ruks, 2015). 
We understand that CTI should be utilized to collect actionable information on the 
adversary’s capabilities, intentions, and ongoing activity useful to the enterprise 
defense. Shortening the window between a compromise and when that compromise is 
detected is the key and possible only by fast and reliable CTI sharing. The goal of such 
effort leads to risk mitigation by profiling and predicting attacks to block on the left side 
of the kill-chain. The challenge however, lies in collecting quality and actionable IOCs 
that can be minimized by having better interoperability across security tools through 
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establishing common standards. Having common standards also allow CTI vendors to 
integrate off the shelf that saves money for both vendor and the client. 
 Valuable CTI is available in both industry and government. Regulatory 
compliance guidelines and laws are not enough to safeguard critical data. Collective 
defense approach is only possible when all parties increase their CTI sharing. Time 
critical nature of CTI demands quick action and seamless integration, but organizations 
are not always at liberty to share. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) handed over 
the development of global foundational cyber security specification (STIX, TAXII and 
CybOX) to OASIS Cyber Threat Intelligence Technical Committee (OASIS CTI TC) on 
May 2015 with a hope for better collaboration and broader acceptance across the globe 
as sometimes, it is regarded that sending information to the government is a one-sided 
communication. OASIS CTI TC (2017) recently published their Committee Specification 
01 for STIX 2.0 and TAXII 2.0 standards in July 2017 with some major changes. 
Currently, they are working on STIX 2.0 and TAXII 2.0 interoperability specification 
document and building out tools to support backward compatibility, more conversions 
and better integration. 
Approaches to CTI is based on the consumer and what they aim to achieve from 
it. Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) is an accepted standard and will 
be a good choice for complex CTI projects to increase the odds for success. The board 
however needs high-level information on changing risk and a strategic approach to CTI 
is more appropriate for them whereas a tactical approach is more relevant down the 
ladder. Figure 15 shows a typical CTI team in an organization and their data 
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requirement. Organization with several sister concerns or global presence in difference 
locations can benefit from trust group or focused group approach to CTI. 
 
 
Figure 15: CTI team (Chismon and Ruks, 2015) 
  
 During our study, we have looked into different sources of CTI. Organizations 
should plan to incorporate as many credible sources (Internal, External, Community, 
HUMINT) as they can, keeping in mind their relevance to the threat defense 
infrastructure and if the collected CTI is actionable. We learned from studying the 
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existing CTI sharing standards that many standards will fit a specific organizational 
need i.e. Vocabulary for Event Recording and Incident Sharing (VERIS) to share 
incident data for analysis of a broad data set, Open Threat Exchange (OTX) to share 
indicator details in a public system, Open Indicators of Compromise (OpenIOC) to 
support their tools when used. The Managed Incident Lightweight Exchange (MILE) 
package (IODEF, IODEF-SCI, RID) and the MITRE package (STIX, TAXII) can be used 
to represent and transport data efficiently (Farnham, 2013). STIX 2.0 and TAXII 2.0 has 
been significantly improved over their predecessors. They are more efficient and can 
model things more accurately across CTI domains.  
Data Feed Providers (DFP) i.e. STAXX, Recorded Future, Hali A TAXII, OTX, 
Limo etc. acts as producers of STIX 2.0 content and OSINT for threat library. Threat 
Intelligence Platforms (TIP) i.e. ThreatConnect, ThreatStream, Soltra, Arbor Networks, 
iSIGHT etc. acts as producer and/or respondent of STIX 2.0 content and are primarily 
used to aggregate, refine, and share CTI across security infrastructure with other 
devices or security personnel. Security Incident and Event Management systems 
(SIEM) i.e. ArcSight, Splunk, QRadar etc. also acts as producer (typically creates 
incidents and indicators) and/or respondent (typically consumes sightings and 
indicators) of STIX 2.0 content. Threat Mitigation System (TMS) i.e. Hexadite, IBM, 
LogRhythm Phantom Cyber, Rapid7 etc. acts on courses of action and other threat 
mitigations such as firewall or IPS, Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) etc. Threat 
Detection System (TDS) i.e. Snort, Bro, web proxy etc. monitors, detects and alerts 
based on signature matching or anomalies in data flow. Threats are constantly evolving, 
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and the CTI tools used in a security infrastructure must constantly update to be at par 
with the trend. The effectiveness of defense is only as good as the ability of the network 
security devices that support it. 
“Each specific IOC, be it shared via intelligence collaboration or collected 
internally, has a reason for its existence and a corresponding set of network 
technologies that would make the best choice for the implementation of detective and 
preventive controls.” (Mack, 2015). More work needs to be done to accurately identify 
IOCs in a network traffic. Three things are important when it comes to IOCs, that they 
are accurate from the beginning, are actionable and they should be acted upon while 
they have a useful lifetime. 
Conclusion 
The rise of CTI is obvious when we see legacy firms revamped their CTI 
practices and offering, investors find new CTI startups interesting, tracking is hard for 
rapidly growing CTI data feeds (see http://threatintelligencereview.com/). It is beyond 
confusion at this moment that Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) is rapidly becoming a 
business priority and the need for sharing is now given. CTI providers and TIP vendors 
are starting to realize that their threat detection technique and information presentation 
may differ, but they must come to common terms with a standardized expression 
language to deal with interoperability issues. Offering confusingly diverse array of CTI 
products is just not helping anymore. Our study of STIX 2.0 and TAXII 2.0 standard 
revealed that the adoption of STIX and TAXII standards has rapidly increased in the 
past few years. World’s largest crowd-sourced CTI provider and platform Alienvault’s 
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Open Threat Exchange (OTX) has updated their capability to provide service as a 
STIX/TAXII server (Doman, 2017). ThreatConnect (2017), a TIP for analytics and 
automation, also integrated STIX and TAXII into their products. These actions tell us the 
story of a change-shift in process where STIX and TAXII is quickly taking control as a 
package for CTI sharing standard for all sharing parties whether they are industry, 
government or individual to react rapidly to new threats. “Knowing the threat will help 
you share intelligence on the threat and will help you craft the best intelligence sharing 
programs, so, never stop studying the threat” (Gourley, 2015). 
Future Work 
When it comes to supporting analyst tradecraft, there is still much to be done. 
Features being discussed for inclusion in upcoming versions of STIX 2.x include 
(MacDonald, 2017), 
• Cryptographic authentication of threat intelligence to prove who produced it. 
• The ability to agree or disagree with assertions from other intelligence 
producers, allowing an analyst to recognize bad threat intelligence.  
• Ability to ask a question to the community and assess responses (e.g. “Does 
anyone have threat intelligence about 1.2.3.4?”). 
• Improved description of confidence levels (e.g. Admiralty code). 
• Addition of Incident Object. 
• Addition of Infrastructure Object. 
• Expanded number of CybOX objects to record more types of observed data. 
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In addition, according to their official github (https://github.com/oasis-tcs/cti-stix2) 
OASIS CTI TC is also planning to introduce in STIX 2.x features such as Enhanced 
malware capabilities, Location Object, and Internationalization Object along with many 
enhancements and bug fixes. 
 The information gained from this study is expected to form a basic understanding 
of how CTI landscape is laid out, available standards and tools, CTI sources, IOCs and 
most importantly an understanding of STIX 2.0 and TAXII 2.0 standard. This knowledge 
will be helpful for the reader in implementing first a TAXII Client (see useful link in 
Appendix D) as a next step and connect to a DFP such as OTX or Hail A TAXII to test 
with subscribed collections and channels. Then implement a TAXII 2.0 server and test 
its API functions. Both github repositories for TAXII client and server is very detailed and 
easy to follow. Implementing TAXII server and client in a publisher-subscriber model 
could be an exciting paper or thesis for anyone interested to learn how to automate CTI 
sharing through TAXII and STIX bundle. Implementing STIX and TAXII in an actual 
security operations environment could be challenging while the standards are still under 
development. But the rapid adoption of STIX and TAXII by the growing community 
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Appendix A: Short description of STIX 2.0 SDOs (1-12) and SROs (13-14) 
# Object Name Description 
1 
 
Attack Pattern A type of Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) that 
describes ways threat actors attempt to compromise targets. 
2 
 
Campaign A grouping of adversarial behaviors that describes a set of 
malicious activities or attacks that occur over a period of time 
against a specific set of targets. 
3 
 
Course of Action  An action taken to either prevent an attack or respond to an attack. 
4 
 
Identity  Individuals, organizations, or groups, as well as classes of 
individuals, organizations, or groups. 
5 
 
Indicator Contains a pattern that can be used to detect suspicious or 
malicious cyber activity. 
6 
 
Intrusion Set A grouped set of adversarial behaviors and resources with common 
properties believed to be orchestrated by a single threat actor. 
7 
 
Malware A type of TTP, also known as malicious code and malicious 
software, used to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of a victim’s data or system. 
8 
 




Report Collections of threat intelligence focused on one or more topics, 
such as a description of a threat actor, malware, or attack 
technique, including contextual details. 
10 
 








Vulnerability A mistake in software that can be directly used by a hacker to gain 
access to a system or network. 
13 
 



























Appendix D: List of helpful links 
OASIS CTI TC Website: 
• Home - https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc_home.php?wg_abbrev=cti  
 
 
OASIS CTI TC Tools and Approved Publications 
• STIX 2.0 Core Concepts - http://docs.oasis-open.org/cti/stix/v2.0/stix-v2.0-part1-stix-core.html  
• STIX 2.0 Objects - http://docs.oasis-open.org/cti/stix/v2.0/stix-v2.0-part2-stix-objects.html  
• STIX 2.0 Cyber Observable Core Concepts - http://docs.oasis-open.org/cti/stix/v2.0/stix-v2.0-part3-
cyber-observable-core.html  
• STIX 2.0 Cyber Observable Objects - http://docs.oasis-open.org/cti/stix/v2.0/stix-v2.0-part4-cyber-
observable-objects.html  
• STIX 2.0 STIX Patterning - http://docs.oasis-open.org/cti/stix/v2.0/stix-v2.0-part5-stix-
patterning.html  
• TAXII 2.0 - http://docs.oasis-open.org/cti/taxii/v2.0/taxii-v2.0.html  
• STIX 2.0 Interoperability Test Document - 
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Bk3QsGqS84odU2iJtTZ8GokLZIOuz52iM7QKkRhJtQc/pub 
• GitHub STIX2 - https://github.com/oasis-tcs/cti-stix2  
• GitHub TAXII2 - https://github.com/oasis-tcs/cti-taxii2 
 
 
OASIS TC Open Repositories: 
• Python APIs for STIX 2 - https://github.com/oasis-open/cti-python-stix2  
• Convert STIX 1.2 XML to STIX 2.0 JSON - https://github.com/oasis-open/cti-stix-elevator  
• TAXII 2 Server Library Written in Python - https://github.com/oasis-open/cti-taxii-server 
• TAXII 2 Client Library Written in Python - https://github.com/oasis-open/cti-taxii-client  
• Lightweight visualization for STIX 2.0 objects and relationships - https://github.com/oasis-open/cti-
stix-visualization 
• GitHub Pages site for STIX, CybOX, and TAXII - https://github.com/oasis-open/cti-documentation 
• Non-normative schemas and examples for STIX 2.0 - https://github.com/oasis-open/cti-stix2-json-
schemas 
• Supports development of a Python application to convert STIX 2.0 content to STIX 1.x content - 
https://github.com/oasis-open/cti-stix-slider 
• Validate patterns used to express CybOX content in STIX Indicators - https://github.com/oasis-
open/cti-pattern-validator 
• Non-normative schemas and examples for CybOX 3 - https://github.com/oasis-open/cti-cybox3-
json-schemas  
• Match STIX content against STIX patterns - https://github.com/oasis-open/cti-pattern-matcher 
• Validator for STIX 2.0 JSON normative requirements and best practices - https://github.com/oasis-
open/cti-stix-validator 





• Translate STIX 2 Patterning Queries - https://github.com/mitre/stix2patterns_translator 
• Malware Information Sharing Platform & Threat Sharing - https://github.com/MISP/MISP 
• A cyber threat intelligence server based on TAXII 2 and written in Golang - 
https://github.com/freetaxii/freetaxii-server 
• APIs for generating STIX 2.x and TAXII 2.x messages with Go (Golang) - 
https://github.com/freetaxii/libstix2 
• The CaRT file format is used to store/transfer malware and its associated metadata -  
https://bitbucket.org/cse-assemblyline/cart 
• Convert STIX2 to GraphML or GEXF (Gephi format) - https://github.com/workingDog/StixConvert 
• Convert STIX2 and load into Neo4j graph database - https://github.com/workingDog/StixToNeoDB 
• A browser App to add STIX 2.1 objects to a TAXII-2.0 server - 
https://github.com/workingDog/cyberstation 
• STIX2 Scala library - https://github.com/workingDog/scalastix 
• TAXII2 Scala library - https://github.com/workingDog/Taxii2LibScala 
• TAXII2 JS library - https://github.com/workingDog/taxii2lib  
• A repository for development of the TAXII Specifications - https://github.com/TAXIIProject/TAXII-
Specifications/wiki  
